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DISCOVERABILITY OF INSURANCE LIMITS
By KENNETH M. WORMWOOD*
The main question or problem which will be covered in this
article is the problem of discoverability of insurance limits in pre-
trial preparation. The basis for discovery of the insurance policy
limits is based either upon Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b) as respects the
scope of examination in a discovery deposition, or Rule 45(d) as
respects production of documentary evidence which is to be pro-
duced at the time a discovery deposition is taken. The more im-
portant of these two rules is 26 (b):
Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court as provided by Rule 30 (b) or (d), the deponent may
be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
examining party or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge or relevant facts. It is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'
Rule 26 (b) was copied after the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and neither it nor the Federal Rule originally contained the
last sentence. The early federal decisions interpreting this rule held
that the information to be elicited from the deponent had to be evi-
dence which would be admissible at the time of trial. As this was
not the real intent of the rule, the federal rule was modified in
1946 and then in 1951 the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended to conform with the federal amendment to the effect that:
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmis-
sible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably cal-
culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
' '
-
It should be pointed out and emphasized that under this amend-
ment testimony which would still be inadmissible at the trial may
be elicited from the deponent in the discovery deposition, or inter-
rogatories, if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. In other words, it
would appear clear in a reading of this amendment that testimony
which would not reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence would not be proper. This certainly was the
belief of many trial attorneys until the case of Lucas v. District
Court,3 which holds that an interrogatory as to the limits of an
automobile policy is proper and that the defendant must answer
such a question. Since this decision was handed down in 1959, most
*Partner in The Denver firm of Wormwood, O'Dell and Wolvington.
1 Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b) as amended 1951.
2 Ibid.
3 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959).
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attorneys have assumed that in any case involving an automobile
policy the defendant, when requested, must advise as to the policy
limits. The opinion that this is not the case and that the ruling in
Lucas v. District Court is limited in its scope, is hereafter pointed
out.
The background of the Lucas case, as well as what occurred
at the oral argument, is quite interesting and most helpful in ana-
lyzing that case.4 The Lucas case arose out of an automobile dam-
age action in Pueblo. The plaintiff, upon taking defendant's deposi-
tion, had inquired of the defendant as to the name of his insurance
carrier and the limits of his policy. The defendant readily disclosed
the name of his carrier, with no objection from his attorney, since
there are many decisions in Colorado holding it proper on voir dire
jury examination to inquire whether or not the jurors are officers,
employees or policyholders of a specific insurance company. Cer-
tainly, with such a rule of law, the plaintiff is entitled to know
the name of the insurance company involved, so as to properly
interrogate the jury. There would be no legitimate reason for re-
fusing to give this information, even though it would not be ad-
missible in evidence at the trial.
The attorney for the defendant did, however, object to de-
fendant's disclosing the limits of his policy and instructed him not
to answer. The trial court sustained the defendant's position in that
respect and the plaintiff then proceeded to the supreme court, ask-
ing the court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court
to require the defendant to answer this question. Counsel for the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the nature of a
writ of mandamus on the ground that this was not the proper pro-
cedure to follow. An order of court was obtained authorizing a
specified time within which to file an answer brief on the question
of discoverability of the policy limits, in the event the court denied
their motion to dismiss.
Through a misunderstanding in the supreme court, the court,
after having this matter under consideration for some time, handed
down its decision, holding that the defendant was required under
Rule 26 (b) to disclose the policy limits. When the court's attention
was called to the fact that the defendant had never filed an answer
4 Editor's note: Mr. Wormwood appeared as amicus curiae on the petition for rehearing in
Lucas v. District Court, taking the position that the defendant should not be forced to disclose the
limits of his automobile insurance policy.
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brief on this issue, the court immediately granted a petition for
rehearing and also granted permission for a brief to be filed by
amici curiae. During the oral argument, it was pointed out to the
court that amicus curiae felt the opinion requiring this disclosure
was exactly contrary and opposed to the Colorado rule of law re-
garding supplemental proceedings in aid to execution, as provided
for under Rule 69 (d) Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure:
Order for Appearance of Judgment Debtor; Arrest. At any
time when execution may issue on a judgment, the judg-
ment creditor shall be entitled to an order requiring the
judgment debtor to appear before the court or a master at
a specified time and place to answer concerning his prop-
erty .... 5
It will be seen from this rule that the right to interrogate a
party as to his assets, which we contended included an insurance
policy, is a right that the judgment creditor has against the judg-
ment debtor after a judgment has been obtained. In other words,
these are supplemental proceedings and not such proceedings as
are permitted prior to judgment.
It was pointed out to the court that while the particular ques-
tion before it only involved an automobile insurance policy, if the
court ruled the defendant was required to disclose the limits of the
policy, it was going against the rule as to supplemental proceedings
and was simply the first wedge opening the door that would lead
to a rule of court which could eventually mean that in any damage
action a plaintiff could interrogate the defendant as to any assets
he might have even though later the defendant might be victorious
on the issue of liability. It was also pointed out that if the court's
opinion held the defendant must answer this question as to an
automobile policy, it would follow that a defendant would have
to answer this question as to any type of policy, such ag a malprac-
tice policy, landlord and tenant's policy, or other type of insurance
which a defendant might carry. Mr. Justice Doyle, who wrote the
majority opinion, stated from the bench that the court did not in-
tend to go that far and had limited its opinion to simply an auto-
mobile policy.
The Lucas case was a four to three decision. Mr. Justice Doyle's
majority opinion was concurred in by two other justices. Mr. Jus-
tice Sutton wrote a strong dissenting opinion, concurred in by two
other justices, and Mr. Justice Frantz tipped the scales by specially
concurring in the majority opinion. It is quite interesting to note
that prior to the Lucas decision, in 1954 when Mr. Justice Frantz
was on the district bench as a trial judge, he wrote an opinion in
the case of Kessler v. Petersen,6 wherein he held the defendant was
not required to disclose the policy limits and stated:
As the Court views it, the testimony sought to be elic-
ited in the taking of the defendant's deposition would not
have a tendency in the remotest degree to establish the
probability or improbability of any of the allegations in the
complaint.'
5 Cofo. R. Civ. P. 69(d).
6 Civil No. A-95697, District Court, City and County of Denver, 1954.
7 Ibid.
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It should be noted that in Mr. Justice Frantz' specially concurring
opinion he changes his thinking, based solely on the fact that Rule
26 (b) allows examination as "to the claim or defense of any other
party," and states that as soon as an assured is involved in an
accident covered by his insurance policy he has a claim against
the insurance company and, consequently, the plaintiff has the
right to interrogate him concerning that claim.
Mr. Justice Doyle in the majority opinion readily agrees that
the amount of the insurance coverage would not lead to any evi-
dence which would be admissible at trial, but seems to base his
opinion on two grounds. First, that if the limits are disclosed to the
plaintiff it will lead to a settlement of claims, and second, that:
"In the light of our Safety Responsibility Act and taking into ac-
count its objects and purposes, we are of the opinion that the in-
quiries concerning the existence of liability insurance and extent
of coverage are 'relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action.' ", To date there has been no other case before the
supreme court on this question of disclosure of the policy limits.
We might state that the rule in the Lucas case is not the uni-
versal rule on this point. As a matter of fact, the majority of the
states seem to hold that disclosure of policy limits prior to judg-
ment is not proper. For instance, in the case of Jeppesen v. Swan-
son,9 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in ruling that the defendant
did not have to disclose the limits of his insurance policy, made
the following cogent remarks:
It would seem to us that, even though the discovery is
not to be limited to facts which may be admissible as evi-
dence, the ultimate goal is to ascertain facts or information
which may be used for proof or defense of an action. Such
information may be discovered by leads from other discov-
erable information. The purpose of the discovery rules is to
take the surprise out of trials of cases so that all relevant
facts and information pertaining to the action may be ascer-
tained in advance of trial. Where it is sought to discover
information which can have no possible bearing on the
determination of the action on its merits, it can hardly be
within the rule. It is not intended to supply information for
the personal use of a litigant that has no connection with
the determination of the issues involved in the action on
their merits. ...
Under the guise of liberal construction, we should not
emasculate the rules by permitting something which never
was intended or is not within the declared objects for
which they were adopted. Neither should expedience or
the desire to dispose of lawsuits without trial, however
desirable that may be from the standpoint of relieving con-
gested calendars, be permitted to cause us to lose sight
of the limitations of the discovery rules or the boundaries
beyond which we should not go. If, perchance, we have the
power under the enabling act to extend the discovery rules
8 Lucas v. District Court, supra note 3, at 516.
9 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
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to permit discovery of information desired for the sole
purpose of encouraging or assisting in negotiations for
settlement of tort claims, it would be far better to amend
the rules so as to state what may and what may not be
done in that field than to stretch the present discovery
rules so as to accomplish something which the language of
the rules does not permit.10
It is interesting to note that in the recent case of State v.
Elliott," the Missouri Supreme Court rejects the Lucas case, and
in so doing states:
The question presented is one of first impression in this
state. It has seldom arisen in other jurisdictions and the
cases on the subject are not in agreement. The respondent
cites People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145
N.E.2d 588; Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d
1064, and Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680,
3 Cal. Rptr. 267. These cases reject the concept that the
information sought must be admissible in evidence and
apparently give no effect to the provision of the rule that
the matter must be reasonably calculated to lead to ad-
missible evidence if the matter itself is not admissible....
The more persuasive cases from other jurisdictions have
held against requiring disclosure of policy limits. They are
better reasoned and more consistent with the primary pur-
pose of the rules relating to pretrial discovery."12
In reading the Lucas case and the grounds set forth in the
majority opinion, the ruling of that case appears to be that the
only time a defendant should be required to disclose the limits
of his automobile policy is when such policy has been issued to
him by reason of the Safety Responsibility Act.1 3 This interpreta-
tion of the decision is shared in A.L.R. which states, in citing the
Lucas case,
In action arising from automobile accident, since any
liability policy is subject to state safety responsibility law,
questions may be propounded in pretrial depositions as to
existence of liability insurance and policy limits thereof.
1 4
As a matter of fact, the interpretation of the Lucas case sug-
gested here does not go as far as that of the A.L.R. author, who
recognizes that the Lucas case is based on the Safety Responsibility
Law, but seems to feel the case holds that "any liability policy is
subject to the State Safety Responsibility Law." It is not believed
that this is a correct interpretation.
Except for subsequent decisions by the Colorado Supreme
Court, it might be said that the Lucas case was authority for the
proposition that in any automobile policy the defendant was
required to disclose the policy limits. In the Lucas decision it did
not appear whether the defendant's policy was a voluntary policy
10 Id. at 656, 658.
11 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963).
12 Id. at 636.
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-7-19 (1953).
14 A.L.R.2d Supp. 911 (1962).
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or an involuntary policy, that is, one required by the Safety Re-
sponsibility Act.
In a subsequent case, Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Gonacha,15
the insurance company had denied coverage under the insurance
policy, due to misrepresentations made by the assured at the
time the policy was issued. Subsequent thereto, the injured party
instituted suit against the assured, Gonacha, and obtained judg-
ment. Thereafter Gonacha and his judgment creditors instituted
an action against Safeco, alleging that at the time of the accident
Gonacha was insured against public liability by Safeco. The trial
court ruled that the misrepresentation by Gonacha in obtaining
the policy was not binding upon the judgment creditor, that under
the Safety Responsibility Law the liability of the insurance carrier
became absolute when the accident occurred, and that the in-
surance company could not raise the defense of misrepresentation
in obtaining the policy against the judgment creditor. The supreme
court reversed the lower court, holding that this was a voluntary
policy, not one required under the Safety Responsibility Law,
and that this law was therefore inapplicable. The court stated:
C.R.S. '53, 13-7-19 applies to a driver having prior acci-
dents, who has manifested financial irresponsibility and
submits to the Director a policy "as proof" of future respon-
sibility in order that he may continue to operate an auto-
mobile. Substantially identical enactments have been con-
strued to apply only to "mandatory policies" as distin-
15 142 Colo. 170, 350 P.2d 189 (1960).
u'f, jjEwvE1 j2afy/oos (a.
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the confident line
Those words could mean several things.
_ They could mean the feeling of confid-
ence you get from authoritative styling.
Or they could mean the feeling of con-
fidence you get from wearing clothes
with lines as beautifully tailored as Kup-
penheimer. In this case, they mean both
things, which is why we say the Kuppen-
heimer Look is the Confident Look. Come
in and try on a new Kuppenheimer, and
you'll see why. 110.00 and 125.00
Men's Shop-all 3 "Denvers"
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guished from "voluntary policies." This is manifest from a
careful reading of C.R.S. '53, 13-7, commonly referred to as
'Colorado Financial Responsibility Law' . . . .
The policy sued on in the instant case was not issued as
the consequence of Gonacha's previous accident record
under the provisions of this enactment, and was not deliv-
ered to and approved by the Insurance Commissioner as as-
surance of Gonacha's ability to meet the demands of future
accidents. Colorado has no compulsory automobile insur-
ance law, and the policy here considered was a "voluntary"
one. In such circumstances the trial court erred in direct-
ing a verdict for plaintiffs. 16
The Safeco case was immediately followed by Drake v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,1" which was in turn followed by Western
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wann.ls In the latter case the automobile insurance
policy had a clause which excluded injuries to employees of the
insured "while engaged in his employment." Wann was injured
while working for the insured when struck by a car driven by
a co-employee. The employer had only two employees and was
not subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Wann sued the
employer for damages and recovered judgment, and thereafter
in a garnishment proceeding attempted to recover against the
insurance company. Wann's position was that under the Colorado
Financial Responsibility Act the company could not have such
an exclusion in its policy. The trial court agreed with Wann and
entered judgment for him. The supreme court reversed, holding
that the exclusion was proper and applicable, and as regards the
Colorado Financial Responsibility Act, stated:
Counsel for Wann urge that the exclusion provision runs
contrary to the Colorado Financial Responsibility Act
and that the contract of insurance is subject to all of the
provisions thereof. Complete answer to this is found in the
admission of counsel that taking of this insurance by
Hamacher was entirely voluntary on his part-he was
under no compulsion to have any insurance. In such a
situation the Financial Responsibility Act does not come
into play.19
It is suggested that under the authority of the last three
cited cases when applied to the Lucas case, the trial courts, and
eventually the supreme court, should hold that the requirement
to disclose policy limits should be limited to those policies which
are required under the Safety Responsibility Act, that is, "involun-
tary policies," and not to policies which are not required under the
Act, that is, "voluntary policies."
As stated above, Mr. Justice Doyle, at the time of the oral
argument, indicated that the Lucas ruling was confined solely
to automobile liability policies. Other jurisdictions which have
allowed discoverability of policy limits prior to judgment have
gone further and have allowed such discoverability in other
16 Id. at 175, 350 P.2d 192.
17 142 Colo. 244, 350 P.2d 566 (1960).
18 147 Colo. 457, 363 P.2d 1054 (1961).
19 Id. at 460, 363 P.2d 1055.
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types of insurance policies. For instance, California has allowed
discoverability of the policy limits in a malpractice case.20 The
California court states in its opinion that it sees no difference
between a policy of insurance for liability for negligent practice
of the healing arts and an automobile liability policy. Further, in
California it has been held that discovery concerning liability
insurance is proper in a malpractice and fraud case against a
civil engineer .2
1
The United States District Judge for the District of Montana
has held that such discoverability regarding policy limits may
be had as regards a boat liability policy.22 In Michigan the defend-
ant Board of Regents of the University of Michigan was required
to disclose a liability policy obtained by the Board, and the limits
thereof, for the purpose of showing that as far as those limits
were concerned there was no governmental immunity.
2 3
Another interesting situation arises under this subject. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953) provides for exemplary damages in all
civil actions, under certain circumstances. The Colorado Supreme
Court has held in several cases that where exemplary damages
are sought to be recovered in an action, it is proper at the time
of the trial to question the defendant as to his financial worth;
that exemplary damages being punitive in nature, the financial
condition of the defendant may be shown in order for the jury to
determine what amount of punitive damages should properly be
awarded.
2 4
With the supreme court holding that evidence of the financial
worth of a defendant may be introduced at the time of trial,
where punitive damages are sought, it would certainly follow that
the plaintiff in pre-trial discovery could interrogate the defendant
regarding his financial worth, if exemplary damages are sought.
The next question arises as to whether such discovery procedure
could include the question of the limits of the automobile insur-
ance policy. Clearly, if exemplary damages were covered under
an automobile insurance policy then the question would be proper.
However, exemplary damages are not covered under an insurance
policy, and if in fact the insurance company attempted to cover
such damages, the provision would be void.
We have only one Colorado case involving this exact question,
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery.25 The supreme court in this
case held exemplary damages were not covered under that par-
ticular policy, and stated:
Included in the total amount of the judgment entered
against the garnishee herein was the award of exemplary
damages against defendant Callahan in the sum of $1,000.
This award was primarily for the punishment of Callahan
for his wrongful acts and as a warning to others. It was
20 London v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 39, 334 P.2d 638 (1959).
21 Rolf Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 2d 876, 9 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1960).
22 Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961).
23 Crriste v. Board of Regents, 364 Mich. 202, 111 N.W.2d 30 (1961).
24 E.g., Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 424, 22 P.2d 640 (1933) (concurring opinion); McAllister
v. McAllister, 72 Colo. 28, 209 Pac. 788 (1922); Courvoisier v. Raymond, 23 Colo. 113, 47 Pac. 284
(1896).
25 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
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in no wise compensation to the injured party for bodily in-
juries or actual loss occasioned by the negligence of Calla-
han. The insurance company did not participate in this
wrong, and was under no contract to indemnify against
such. In this particular matter the policy indemnifies
against damages for bodily injuries, and nothing in addi-
tion is contracted for, and there is no further liability. The
injured will not be allowed to collect from a non-partici-
pating party for a wrong against the public.26 (Emphasis
supplied.)
This is the general rule all over the United States. The most
recent decision in that respect is Northwest Nat'l Cas. Co. v.
McNulty,2 7 wherein the Federal court goes into the question fully,
holding that it would be against public policy for an insurance
company to issue insurance covering a person for exemplary
damages.
It will be seen from this article that there are still many
questions involving discoverability of insurance policy limits
which have not been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court.
It is suspected that the ingenuity of both the plaintiffs' bar and
the defense bar is such that many of these questions will even-
tually find their way to the supreme court for determination.
26 Id. at 17, 39 P.2d 779.
27 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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